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Research Question/Issue: In this study, we examine the impact of family firm status
on publicly listed firms' leverage ratios. Furthermore, we investigate the moderating
role of a country's institutional setting, especially its shareholder and creditor rights,
on this relationship.
Research Findings/Insights: Conducting a meta-analysis on 869 effect sizes from
613 studies, we find an overall slightly negative but significant relationship between
family firm status and leverage. Our results reveal a large amount of heterogeneity
and considerable mean effect size differences across the 48 countries included in the
study. The results of our meta-regression analysis reveal significant moderating
effects of shareholder and creditor rights on family firms' capital structure decisions.
Whereas stronger shareholder rights have a positive impact on family firm leverage,
stronger creditor rights have a negative impact.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Our study combines the two dominating and
competing views on family firm leverage. On the one hand, the overall lower leverage
ratio of family firms confirms the risk-aversion view of family firms. On the other
hand, control considerations also have a significant impact on leverage ratios, as fam-
ily firms adjust their capital structure dependent on shareholder and creditor rights in
their home country. Our study highlights the importance of the institutional setting
on firms' financing patterns.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: The results suggest a significant impact of a coun-
try's institutional setting in general, and its strength on shareholder and creditor
rights in particular, on family firms' capital structure decisions. Control considerations
result in a strategic use of debt financing that ensures the owner family's dominant
position in the firm and prevents potentially harmful conflicts with minority share-
holders or creditors.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Corporate governance attributes such as ownership and board
characteristics are important determinants of firms' capital structures
(Berger, Ofek, & Yermack, 1997; Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 2002; Wen,
Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek, 2002). Families are the most common share-
holders around the world and analyzing the capital structure of family
firms has gained increased interest in research (Michiels & Molly, 2017;
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Motylska-Kuzma, 2017; Thiele, 2017). In the literature, there exist
two competing views on the relative use of debt by family firms
compared to other firm types. The first perspective highlights the risk
aversion of family firms due to their owners' low wealth diversification
(Anderson & Reeb, 2003) and argues that family firms avoid debt
because of the accompanying increased bankruptcy risk (Mishra &
McConaughy, 1999). The second perspective highlights the importance
of family owners' control considerations for capital structure decisions.
Following this argumentation, family firms prefer debt as a nondiluting
financing strategy over the issuing of new equity (Croci, Doukas, &
Gonenc, 2011). The empirical findings so far are inconclusive, and
results supporting each view exist. The results also differ across
countries. Lower leverage ratios have been found for family firms in
Chile (Jara, Pinto-Gutiérrez, & Núñez, 2018), France (Benkraiem,
Hamrouni, Miloudi, & Uyar, 2018; Latrous & Trabelsi, 2012; Margaritis
& Psillaki, 2010), Germany (Ampenberger, Schmid, Achleitner, &
Kaserer, 2013; Schmid, 2013), Saudi Arabia (Al-Ajmi, Abo Hussain, &
Al-Saleh, 2009), and the United States (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999).
In contrast, higher leverage ratios have been found for family firms
in Australia (Setia-Atmaja, 2010; Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully,
2009), Brazil (Kayo, Brunaldi, & Aldrighi, 2018), Canada (King &
Santor, 2008), Egypt (ElBannan, 2017), Italy (Morresi & Naccarato,
2016), Poland (Jewartowski & Kałdonski, 2015), Thailand and Indonesia
(Bunkanwanicha, Gupta, & Rokhim, 2008; Wiwattanakantang, 1999),
the United States (Keasey, Martinez, & Pindado, 2015), and multi-
country samples (Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011; Ellul, 2009).
In this study, we conduct a meta-analysis examining the relation-
ship between family firm status and leverage ratio. Meta-analysis is a
powerful tool to summarize the findings of a research field and to
identify underlying moderators of a relationship of interest (Gonzalez-
Mulé & Aguinis, 2018). Given the contradicting empirical findings and
perspectives on family firm leverage, there is a need for a meta-
analysis. We focus on publicly listed firms, which have a wider array
of financing choices than private firms, are less credit constrained, and
can adjust their capital structures at lower cost (Faulkender &
Petersen, 2005; Myers, 2001). The capital structure choices of public
firms are thus different from those of private firms.
Based on a sample of 869 effect sizes from 613 primary studies
across 48 countries, our univariate meta-analysis reports an overall
slightly negative relationship between public family firms and leverage.
This result supports the view of the risk-averse family firm that
eschews debt. However, in line with the literature, we find consider-
able differences across countries. To explore this heterogeneity, we
investigate the moderating roles of country-level shareholder and
creditor rights in a multivariate hierarchical meta-regression analysis.
Our results show that control considerations matter and lead to a
strategic use of debt, which guarantees the owner family a higher level
of control. Specifically, stronger shareholder rights have a positive
moderating impact on the relationship between family firms and
leverage, whereas stronger creditor rights have a negative moderating
effect. Post hoc analyses further show that the positive effect of
shareholder rights on family firm leverage is especially driven by
minority shareholders' rights in corporate governance. Another
analysis shows that the legal origin of a country seems not to have an
impact on the relationship between family firms and leverage ratios.
Our study contributes to corporate governance, corporate
finance, and family business research in multiple ways. Following ini-
tial works by Modigliani and Miller (1958), Myers (1977, 1984), and
numerous other scholars, the investigation of firms' capital structure
decisions is at the heart of both theoretical and empirical corporate
finance research. Although a large number of empirical studies already
exist, the findings on the determinants and consequences of firms'
capital structure decisions are often inconclusive, which is why a
meta-analysis such as ours can fill an important gap. Our meta-
analysis on the capital structure of public family firms shows that
these firms differ from nonfamily firms and that their capital structure
is influenced by country-level shareholder and creditor rights. Hence,
our study contributes to an important discussion in corporate gover-
nance and corporate finance research about how ownership types
and differences in national corporate governance systems influence
corporate financing and capital structure decisions (e.g., Brailsford
et al., 2002; Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Godlewski, 2020; Shah, Shah,
Smith, & Labianca, 2017). Such an aggregated form of evidence was
previously lacking in capital structure research. Our study also contrib-
utes to the family business literature, where several meta-analyses
already exist, especially with regard to firm performance. Whereas
some of these studies investigate family firm performance in a
general context (e.g., Hansen & Block, 2020; Hansen, Block, &
Neuenkirch, 2020; O'Boyle, Pollack, & Rutherford, 2012; Taras,
Memili, Wang, & Harms, 2018; Wagner, Block, Miller, Schwens, &
Xi, 2015), others focus exclusively on private firms (Carney, Van
Essen, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015), publicly listed US firms (Van
Essen, Carney, Gedajlovic, & Heugens, 2015), or publicly listed family
firms in emerging markets (Duran, Van Essen, Heugens, Kostova, &
Peng, 2019; Wang & Shailer, 2017). Further meta-analyses have been
conducted to shed light on family firms' internationalization (Arregle,
Duran, Hitt, & Van Essen, 2017), innovation (Duran, Kammerlander,
Van Essen, & Zellweger, 2016), and corporate social responsibility
(CSR) behavior (Canavati, 2018). Our study offers a unique contribu-
tion beyond these existing studies in that it is the only meta-analysis
to date that focuses on family firms' financing behavior. Based on our
findings, we suggest that differences in national corporate governance
systems matter for family firm's financing behavior (Aguilera,
Talaulicar, Chung, Jimenez, & Goel, 2015). In this sense, we follow the
calls for further research by Ampenberger et al. (2013), Gómez-Mejía
et al. (2014), and Michiels and Molly (2017), and highlight the impor-
tance of countries' institutional settings in family firms' financial deci-
sion making, especially concerning capital structure decisions. We
identify shareholder and creditor rights as important moderators of
the relationship between family firms and leverage ratios. These insti-
tutions matter because they constitute the framework and context for
owner families' control considerations. Furthermore, our results
enhance the understanding of potential principal–principal conflicts in
family firms concerning financing decisions. Most research on
principal–principal conflicts in family firms so far has been conducted
regarding firm performance (Madison, Holt, Kellermanns, &
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Ranft, 2016). Our study suggests that these principal–principal
conflicts do not only impact firm performance but also structural
characteristics such as capital structure. Finally, our results show that
the risk-aversion (e.g., Mishra & McConaughy, 1999) and control-
consideration perspectives (e.g., Croci, Doukas, & Gonenc, 2011) that
have been suggested for explaining family firm leverage are not
mutually exclusive but that their explanatory power depends on the
national institutional setting.
2 | THEORY AND HYPOTHESES
2.1 | Family firms and leverage ratios
From an agency theory perspective, the optimal leverage ratio is an
interplay of agency conflicts between owners, managers, and credi-
tors. Yet this view provides arguments for both higher and lower
leverage ratios of family firms compared with nonfamily firms. As the
relationship between family firm status and leverage ratio is theoreti-
cally unclear and an open research question, we formulate competing
hypotheses that illustrate the different conceptual arguments.
Debt (and the resulting interest and principal payments) is a pow-
erful tool to discipline managers and to prevent self-serving actions
and empire building (Harris & Raviv, 1991; Jensen, 1986; Stulz, 1990).
In family firms, agency costs from owner–manager conflicts are typi-
cally lower than in nonfamily firms (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), as family
members often hold management positions and thereby ensure the
alignment of interests between the management and the firms' owners
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). Furthermore, family owners have a strong
incentive to monitor the firm's actions because of their high wealth
concentration in the firm even if they are not actively involved in the
management (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). The
lower agency costs result in a lower need for family firms to use debt
and predict lower leverage ratios in family firms compared with
nonfamily firms. Another reason for lower leverage ratios among family
firms is rooted in behavioral agency theory (Wiseman &
Gomez-Mejia, 1998). In general, the firm owners' diversification level is
positively related to the risk level of corporate investments (Faccio,
Marchica, & Mura, 2011; Lyandres, Marchica, Michaely, & Mura, 2019).
Family owners are comparably undiversified shareholders (Anderson &
Reeb, 2003) and attach great value to the preservation of socio-
emotional wealth (SEW; Gómez-Mejía et al., 2007). A higher leverage
ratio, however, increases bankruptcy and thereby firm-specific risk,
which in turn threatens families' SEW. Family owners' fear of loss in
SEW results in more risk-averse strategic decisions, such as lower
research and development (R&D) spending (Chrisman & Patel, 2012)
and lower leverage ratios (Jara, Pinto-Gutiérrez, & Núñez, 2018;
Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). According to Strebulaev and
Yang (2013), family firms are also more likely to be even zero leveraged,
meaning that these firms do not use any debt at all to finance their oper-
ations. Ampenberger et al. (2013), Baek, Cho, and Fazio (2016), and
González, Guzmán, Pombo, and Trujillo (2013) observed that lower lever-
age ratios resulting from higher risk aversion are especially pronounced
in family firms in which family members serve as managers or directors.
These two lines of arguments lead to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1a. Family firm status has a negative effect on firms'
leverage ratios.
Capital structure decisions are also influenced by the agency con-
flict between majority and minority shareholders. Family owners—
being dominant owners—have the power to determine the strategic
direction of the firm because they hold a significant amount of shares
and often appoint family members as chief executive officers (CEOs).
Such concentrated power allows the excessive consumption of pri-
vate benefits of control at the cost of minority shareholders
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). These expropriation activities are especially
severe in the absence of other blockholders with the power to moni-
tor families' expropriation behaviors (Jara-Bertin, López-Iturriaga, &
López-de-Foronda, 2008; Sacristán-Navarro, Cabeza-García, &
Gómez-Ansón, 2015; Santos, Moreira, & Vieira, 2014). Owner families
typically have a long investment horizon with strong transgenerational
intentions and are unwilling to give up control of the firm. From this
perspective, using debt as a financing instrument can be a strategic
means to maintain control over the firm. Whereas issuing new equity
shares dilutes the control of existing shareholders, debt is a non-
diluting financing strategy and strengthens the position of owner–
managers, as they have a higher disposition towards financial
resources (Stulz, 1988). Likewise, a higher leverage ratio decreases
the risk of hostile takeovers (Harris & Raviv, 1988; Stulz, 1988). In this
sense, Croci et al. (2011), Ellul (2009), and King and Santor (2008)
observed higher leverage ratios and a strong aversion of family firms
to equity financing in their studies. Moreover, they find that family
firms implement higher leverage ratios if their voting power is not suf-
ficient on its own and that they use leverage as a substitute for other
control-enhancing mechanisms such as cross-shareholdings or pyra-
mids (Ellul, 2009). Having control-enhancing mechanisms in place,
equity financing may furthermore become less attractive to family
firms, as new shareholders are aware of potential expropriation activi-
ties and require a higher return on their investments, making equity
financing more expensive (Attig, Guedhami, & Mishra, 2008; Boubakri,
Guedhami, & Mishra, 2010). The control consideration view predicts a
pecking order (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) of family firms in
the sense that they prefer debt over equity if retained earnings are
not sufficient to finance new investments (Keasey et al., 2015;
Poutziouris, 2001). The following hypothesis applies:
Hypothesis 1b. Family firm status has a positive effect on firms'
leverage ratios.
2.2 | Country-level shareholder and creditor rights
as moderating factors
Previous studies highlight the importance of the institutional environ-
ment as a moderating factor for firms' capital structure decisions
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(Antoniou et al., 2008; Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, & Maksimovic, 2008;
De Jong, Kabir, & Nguyen, 2008; Fan, Titman, & Twite, 2012;
Öztekin, 2015). Changing the capital structure reallocates the power
between controlling and minority shareholders and influences the
firm's investment policy (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, &
Vishny, 2000). In particular, shareholder and creditor rights and their
enforcement by legal authorities determine the scope of possible stra-
tegic actions for firms' controlling shareholders such as owner fami-
lies. Thus, from a control consideration perspective, the strength of
shareholder and creditor rights extends or limits the power of domi-
nant family shareholders relative to other shareholders and creditors.
Hence, our two moderating hypotheses are an extension of the con-
trol consideration view described in Hypothesis 1b.
2.2.1 | The strength of shareholder rights as a
moderating factor
Strong shareholder rights increase the power of minority shareholders
in return for their capital provision and are intended to limit the
expropriation activities of dominant shareholders. Shareholder rights
include elements such as disclosure and accounting rules, the rights to
vote and to participate in shareholder meetings, or the rights to call
extraordinary shareholder meetings and make legal claims against
directors in case of expropriation (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes,
Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al, 2000). Furthermore, they
inhibit corporate self-dealing by directors and managers (Djankov, La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2008). Countries with strong
shareholder protection typically have larger and more active equity
markets, as outside investors are more willing to provide capital to
firms (La Porta et al., 1997). If countries lack such rules, dominant
shareholders have the opportunity to install corporate governance
structures that secure their interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Exam-
ples are control-enhancing strategies such as pyramids, dual-class
shares, or cross-holdings, which often result in a strong separation of
voting and cash flow rights and in the extraction of private benefits of
control at the expense of minority shareholders (Masulis, Wang, &
Xie, 2009). Family-controlled firms have been shown to use these
mechanisms intensively, especially in countries with weak legal pro-
tection (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). The availability of such
control-enhancing strategies influences the capital structure decisions
of family firms and increases the attractiveness of equity over debt
financing, because family firms are able to raise equity without dilut-
ing the owner families' control. This argument is in line with firm level
evidence from Hagelin, Holmén, and Pramborg (2006) and King and
Santor (2008), who show that family firms use leverage and dual-class
shares as substitutes. If country laws prohibit such control-enhancing
mechanisms, family firms are more likely to rely on debt financing as
their family owners do not want to dilute their control. Moreover,
strong shareholder rights increase the potential for conflicts with
minority shareholders and the contestability of the family owners'
controlling position. Accordingly, family firms will adapt to higher
leverage ratios in these countries. Nonfamily firms, on the other hand,
typically have a dispersed ownership structure or have blockholders
with fewer control considerations. Hence, their capital structure is less
affected by the strength of shareholder rights. We formulate the fol-
lowing moderation hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2. Strong country-level shareholder rights positively
moderate the relationship between family firm status and
leverage ratios.
2.2.2 | The strength of creditor rights as a
moderating factor
Strong creditor rights, on the other hand, increase the power of
lenders—banks as well as bondholders. Creditor rights include regula-
tions on debt enforcement, collateral, and the role and rights of lenders
in the case of debtors' liquidation or reorganization (Djankov, McLiesh, &
Shleifer, 2007; La Porta et al., 1997). In countries with weak creditor
rights, firm owners could invest debt money in overly risky projects and
capture the gains in case of success, while not bearing the costs in the
case of failure (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Fearing the risk of being
expropriated, creditors require consequently higher collaterals or pre-
miums (Boubakri & Ghouma, 2010; Gao, He, Li, & Qu, 2020). In coun-
tries with strong creditor rights, creditors have more influence on the
usage of provided credits, more monitoring possibilities, and stronger
rights in the case of default. Stronger creditor rights increase lenders'
willingness to provide capital and incentivize managers to refrain from
investments that increase bankruptcy risk (Qian & Strahan, 2007;
Rajan & Zingales, 1995). Moreover, the information available to credi-
tors before financing is an important determinant in lending contracts
because it mitigates credit risks and enhances credit to the private sec-
tor on a country level (Jappelli & Pagano, 2002). Two studies suggest
that the strength of creditor rights influences the capital structure of
family firms. Ampenberger et al. (2013) observed lower leverage ratios
for family firms in Germany and argue that tight creditor monitoring in
the German bank-based market prevents family firms from using high
proportions of debt. Likewise, Schmid (2013) showed in a multicountry
study that family firms increase leverage ratios when creditor monitor-
ing is weak but avoid debt in countries where creditors' possibilities to
exert influence are high. We posit that the use of debt as a substitute
for the above-described equity-related control-enhancing mechanisms
becomes less attractive for family firms in countries with strong creditor
rights, as they would replace control-threatening minority shareholders
with strong creditors. By taking up high levels of debt, they would have
to deal with powerful and well-informed creditors and give up control
over their firm, which threatens their SEW. Nonfamily firms, whose
owners do not have these control and SEW considerations, are to a
lower degree affected by this logic and the strength of creditor rights.
Accordingly, we formulate the following moderation hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3. Strong country-level creditor rights negatively moder-
ate the relationship between family firm status and leverage
ratios.
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3 | METHODOLOGY
3.1 | Effect size measure and sample
The focus of this study is to examine the capital structure of public
family firms compared with other types of firms in a meta-analysis.
Meta-analysis allows us to summarize the empirical findings of previ-
ous studies and to identify underlying moderators of the relationship
investigated (Gonzalez-Mulé & Aguinis, 2018). We thus searched for
empirical studies that investigate public firms and report a relationship
between family firms and leverage. Our effect size measure is the
Pearson correlation coefficient (r), which is commonly used in man-
agement and social sciences meta-analyses (Geyskens, Krishnan,
Steenkamp, & Cunha, 2009). Accordingly, studies had to report either
correlation matrices or statistics that can be converted to r, such as
standardized mean differences or t test statistics. We converted these
statistics following Lipsey and Wilson (2001). We then transformed all
effect sizes by Fisher's z transformation (Fisher, 1921) to account for
the skewness of the raw correlations (Hedges & Olkin, 1985). More-
over, the transformation has the favorable characteristic that the
inverse variance weight needed for the analysis depends only on the
effect size and is thus easy to derive (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
We identified suitable primary studies for our sample by
following different search strategies. First, we explored the electronic
databases Google Scholar, EBSCOhost, JSTOR, SSRN, and China
National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) using different search term
combinations concerning family firms and leverage.1 Second, we
tracked published meta-analyses on other family firm topics such as
performance (Van Essen et al., 2015; Wang & Shailer, 2017),
corporate social performance (Canavati, 2018), innovation (Duran
et al., 2016), or internationalization (Arregle et al., 2017). Finally, if
we identified suitable studies that missed the effect sizes needed, we
contacted the author teams and asked them to send us the missing
effect sizes. We made no restrictions on the type of study and
included published articles as well as working papers, doctoral theses,
and student theses. Moreover, we included not only studies written
in English but also studies written in Chinese, French, German,
Italian, Polish, and Spanish.2 Both strategies, including unpublished
and non-English studies, address the potential risk of publication
bias (Rosenthal, 1979; Stanley, 2005; Sutton, 2009). In the case of
multiple effect sizes in a study, for example, different leverage
measures or different family firm variables, we included all of them.
Including all effect sizes leads to better results and prevents a serious
loss of information compared with selecting only one effect size or
calculating average values (Bijmolt & Pieters, 2001). However, we
controlled for dependent effect sizes from the same study by
adopting hierarchical models as described later. The search procedure
resulted in a sample of 665 studies with 949 effect sizes.
We then controlled for multiple studies in our sample based on
the same dataset. We followed the recommendations of Wood (2008)
to identify duplicates and excluded 29 studies (47 effect sizes) from
further analysis. We furthermore conducted an outlier analysis to
prevent biased results due to influential outlier observations by
calculating DFBETA values. DFBETA values reflect the influence of
each observation on the overall mean effect size (Viechtbauer &





(Kutner, Nachtsheim, Neter, & Li, 2005), and we
excluded 33 effect size observations that exceeded this critical value.
The final sample contains 869 effect sizes from 613 studies.3
3.2 | Methods used
We apply two types of meta-analytic techniques: univariate Hedges
and Olkin-type meta-analysis (HOMA: Hedges & Olkin, 1985) and
multivariate meta-regression analysis (MRA: Lipsey & Wilson, 2001).
We use HOMA to identify the overall relation between family
firms and leverage for the whole sample and for different subgroups.
When conducting a meta-analysis, one must choose between two dif-
ferent models: fixed and random effects (Borenstein, Hedges,
Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010; Field, 2001). We opt for a random-effects
model because it allows for variation in the true effect size from study
to study, which is more plausible in our case compared with a fixed-
effects model, which assumes a common true effect size across the
included studies (Borenstein, Hedges, Higgins, & Rothstein, 2010).
We use the inverse variance (w) to weight the effect sizes (Hedges &
Olkin, 1985) and use the sum of these weights to calculate the stan-
dard error, the z statistic, and the confidence interval of the mean
effect size (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We use the restricted maximum-
likelihood (REML) estimator for the estimation of the between-study
variance owing to its efficiency and unbiasedness (Viechtbauer, 2005).
We further account for the dependency of effect sizes from the same
study by a multilevel structure (Konstantopoulos, 2011; Raudenbush &
Bryk, 2002). Although Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) recommended using
the complete set of observations from each study, they caution that
ignoring the dependency of these observations may inflate the results.
Multiple observations in our case could result from the use of various
family firm or leverage variables. We thus control for these dependen-
cies by introducing additional study-level random effects.
Second, we use MRA to explore the moderating effects of the
study- and country-level variables on the relationship between family
firms and capital structure. MRA allows us to test our moderator
hypotheses in a multivariate weighted least squares (WLS) regression.
The dependent variable in the regression is the z transformed focal
effect between family firms and leverage and is regressed on a set of
independent and control variables. Again, we weight all observations
by their inverse variance (Lipsey & Wilson, 2001). We follow
Gonzalez-Mulé and Aguinis's (2018) best practice recommendations
for meta-regressions in management research. In MRA, one has again
to choose between two types of models: fixed and mixed effects.
Mixed-effects models have the same assumptions as random-effects
models in HOMA but also incorporate fixed factors in the form of the
moderator variables (Gonzalez-Mulé & Aguinis, 2018). We choose the
mixed-effects model and the REML estimator for the estimation of
residual heterogeneity. Again, we apply a multilevel model and add
study-level random effects, resulting in a three-level meta-regression
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(Van den Noortgate, López-López, Marín-Martínez, & Sánchez-
Meca, 2013). We conducted our meta-analyses in R and used the
metafor package (Viechtbauer, 2010).
3.3 | Moderator variables
We include several variables in the analyses to investigate moderating
effects of the relationship between family firms and leverage. Most
importantly, we include variables that reflect a country's level of
shareholder and creditor rights to test our hypotheses. In addition, we
control for further country-specific characteristics. We also control
for methodological aspects in terms of variable constructions and
study characteristics. Appendix A lists all variables and data sources.
3.3.1 | Country-level shareholder and creditor
rights
We obtained the level of shareholder and creditor rights from the
World Bank's Doing Business database. To measure Shareholder rights,
we use the “Protecting Minority Investors” index, which is based on
the methodology of Djankov et al. (2008). The index is calculated for
each country as the mean of six different indicators on disclosure
requirements, director liability, the ease of shareholder suits, the
extent of shareholder rights, protection mechanisms from entrench-
ment, and corporate transparency. It ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 as
the highest level. Second, we use the “Getting Credit” score to mea-
sure Creditor rights. This index, based on Djankov et al. (2007), incor-
porates a country's strength of the legal rights of borrowers and
lenders in terms of collateral and bankruptcy laws as well as the scope
and accessibility of credit information. It also ranges from 0 to 10, with
10 being the highest value.
3.3.2 | Country-level control variables
We include further country-level variables to control for each coun-
try's law system, financial system, and economic development. First,
we include the “Enforcing Contracts” index from the World Bank's
Doing Business database (Enforcing contracts index). The index incor-
porates the efficiency of resolving commercial disputes and the quality
of judicial processes. Therefore, it does not reflect the written law of a
country itself but rather its actual enforcement by the law system.
Next, we control for the financial system of a country, which can
be either bank based or market based. The type of financial system
does not per se affect a firm's access to external financing (Demirgüc-
Kunt & Maksimovic, 2002) but rather the choice between public
financing via stocks and bonds or private financing via bank loans than
the level of leverage (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). However, in the case of
family firms, the type of financial system might well explain differ-
ences compared with nonfamily firms across countries. Family firms
often build up relational capital with debt providers, which provides
them better access to debt and prevents credit restrictions, especially
when credit markets are constrained (Crespí & Martín-Oliver, 2015;
Cucculelli, Peruzzi, & Zazzaro, 2019; D'Aurizio, Oliviero, &
Romano, 2015). To operationalize the financial system, we adopt the
financial structure index (Financial structure index) by Demirgüç-Kunt
and Levine (1999). The index takes into consideration the size, activ-
ity, and efficiency of a country's capital market relative to its banking
sector. We gathered all necessary ratios from the World Bank's World
Development Indicator database and calculated the financial structure
index for each country with the mean ratios from 1996 to 2016. Posi-
tive values indicate a more market-based financial system, whereas
negative values indicate a more bank-based financial system.
Finally, we control for the overall economic development of a
country in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. Again,
we use the mean values from 1996 to 2016 and transform them by
taking their natural logarithm (Ln GDP/capita).
3.3.3 | Family firm variables
In the academic literature, there is a wide array of family firm defini-
tions (for an overview, see Diaz-Moriana, Hogan, Clinton, &
Brophy, 2019; Mazzi, 2011). Typically, these definitions use owner-
ship, management, and governance attributes alone or in combination.
We use six different dummy variables to reflect the different defini-
tion types used in the primary studies. We set Family ownership per-
cent equal to 1 if studies use family ownership as a continuous
variable and Family ownership dummy equal to 1 if studies use an own-
ership dummy to measure family influence. Likewise, we set Family
management and Family supervisory board equal to 1 if studies examine
the effect of family members' participation in the management or
supervisory boards. For combined definitions, we distinguish between
two possible variants. Strong family influence is equal to 1 if studies
require at least two attributes to be prevalent (e.g., ownership and
management), whereas Undefined family influence requires only one of
the three various influence types (e.g., ownership or management).
In addition to the family firm definition used, we also control for
generational stage. Founder generation is a dummy variable equal to
1 if the family firm variable in the primary study controls for an active
founder. Later generation is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the family
influence is realized through a later generation. If both variables are
0, the study does not control for the generational stage (No genera-
tional control).
3.3.4 | Leverage ratio variables
We identified four alternatives that are commonly used by empirical
studies to calculate the leverage ratio and that differ in the numera-
tors and denominators used. Regarding the denominator, researchers
divide the level of debt either by firms' total assets or by firms' equity.
Regarding the numerator, most studies use total debt, but some also
use only long-term debt to calculate the leverage ratio. Hence, Total
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debt/assets, Total debt/equity, Long-term debt/assets, or Long-term
debt/equity are equal to 1 if a study uses the respective measure to
operationalize leverage.
3.3.5 | Sample and study control variables
We include several variables that characterize the primary studies'
samples and the studies themselves. First, we control for firm size. In
most countries, the number of firms listed on the stock market is
rather small. As a consequence, most studies use the complete sample
of firms with available data (All listed firms). Some studies, however,
concentrate only on the largest firms listed or on comparably small
firms. Thus, we include the dummy variables Large cap and Small cap,
which are equal to 1 if a study concentrates only on large-cap or
small-cap firms, respectively.
Further variables are used to control for study characteristics.
With regard to the type of article, we distinguish between Journal arti-
cle, Working paper, PhD thesis, and Student thesis. Furthermore, we
coded the median year of the sample period (Median year) and the
data structure of the study (Panel dataset, equal to 1 for a panel data
set and 0 for a cross-sectional data set).
4 | RESULTS
4.1 | HOMA results
Table 1 reports the results of the HOMA for the complete sample and
the methodological moderators. The findings show that, on average,
listed family firms have a lower leverage ratio than listed nonfamily
firms (r = −0.017, p ≤ 0.001). The result is based on 869 effect sizes
TABLE 1 HOMA results (H1)
k n firms r SE 95% CI Q I2 z-test
Overall effect (H1) 869 613 436,886 −0.017 *** 0.003 −0.023; −0.011 1,911.01 (0.00) 56.67%
Family variables
Family ownership percent 210 186 86,568 −0.029 *** 0.006 −0.040; −0.018 369.90 (0.00) 44.55% Ref. cat.
Family ownership dummy 232 207 149,824 0.002 0.004 −0.007; 0.010 454.52 (0.00) 45.25% z = 4.33***
Family management 121 96 52,985 −0.024 *** 0.007 −0.038; −0.009 229.81 (0.00) 48.03% z = 0.53
Family supervisory board 74 64 21,932 0.006 0.010 −0.013; 0.025 118.76 (0.00) 37.48% z = 3.01***
Strong family influence 121 102 60,865 −0.017 ** 0.007 −0.031; −0.003 253.80 (0.00) 54.15% z = 1.29
Undefined family influence 111 105 64,712 −0.047 *** 0.008 −0.062; −0.031 300.27 (0.00) 65.83% z = 1.88*
Family firm generation
No generational control 810 599 407,195 −0.017 *** 0.003 −0.023; −0.011 1,779.57 (0.00) 56.32% Ref. cat.
Founder generation 36 32 16,207 −0.036 *** 0.011 −0.058; −0.014 51.70 (0.03) 34.61% z = 1.61
Later generation 23 17 13,484 −0.018 0.021 −0.058; 0.022 70.75 (0.00) 69.97% z = 0.04
Financial leverage
Total debt/assets 523 381 262,403 −0.012 *** 0.004 −0.020; −0.005 1,246.76 (0.00) 59.57% Ref. cat.
Total debt/equity 161 102 73,914 −0.016** 0.007 −0.029; −0.003 273.32 (0.00) 46.16% z = 0.43
Long-term debt/assets 163 129 94,565 −0.034*** 0.006 −0.046; −0.022 313.39 (0.00) 54.67% z = 2.89***
Long-term debt/equity 22 17 6,004 −0.003 0.018 −0.038; 0.031 28.69 (0.12) 30.85% z = 0.50
Firm size
All listed firms 733 508 405,729 −0.013*** 0.003 −0.019; −0.007 1,647.69 (0.00) 56.35% Ref. cat.
Small cap 10 7 2,160 −0.060* 0.035 −0.129; 0.009 13.12 (0.16) 43.35% z = 1.33
Large cap 126 98 28,997 −0.044*** 0.009 −0.062; −0.026 203.26 (0.00) 45.82% z = 3.22***
Article type
Journal article 643 471 284,810 −0.014*** 0.004 −0.021; −0.007 1,267.14 (0.00) 89.38% Ref. cat.
Working paper 109 74 90,824 −0.030*** 0.007 −0.044; −0.016 306.65 (0.00) 72.53% z = 2.01**
Ph.D. thesis 64 32 44,312 −0.018 0.012 −0.041; 0.005 207.80 (0.00) 54.98% z = 0.32
Student thesis 53 36 16,940 −0.031** 0.012 −0.056; −0.007 74.06 (0.02) 39.73% z = 1.34
Note: This table reports the results of the univariate Hedges and Olkin type meta-analysis (HOMA) on family firm leverage. All variables are described in
Appendix A. k denotes the number of effect sizes. n denotes the number of studies. r denotes the mean effect size. SE denotes the standard error. 95%
CI denotes the 95% confidence interval. Q denotes the amount of residual heterogeneity and its significance (p-value in parentheses). I2 denotes the
proportion of between-study variance to total variance. z-test denotes the significance test for mean effect size differences between two groups. Mean
effect sizes are calculated with additional random effects corresponding to the study level.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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and 436,886 included firms from 613 unique primary studies. Further-
more, we identify a high amount of effect size heterogeneity in terms
of residual heterogeneity (Q), indicating the likely presence of modera-
tor effects (Gonzalez-Mulé and Aguinis, 2018). For the proportion of
between-study to total variation (I2), Higgins and Thompson (2002)
suggested a threshold of 50% as an indicator of substantial heteroge-
neity. According to our results, more than 56% of the total heteroge-
neity can be attributed to between-study variation. The heterogeneity
in terms of test statistics is graphically supported by the funnel plot in
Figure 1, which shows that there is also a substantial amount of posi-
tive effect sizes in our sample. In total, about 57% of all effect sizes
show negative values, whereas about 41% are positive and 1.6% are
equal to zero.
Concerning the family firm definition used, we find strong nega-
tive effects for Family ownership percent (r = −0.029, p ≤ 0.001), Family
management (r = −0.024, p ≤ 0.01), and Undefined family influence
(r = −0.047, p ≤ 0.001). Furthermore, we find only a slightly negative
effect for Strong family influence (r = −0.017, p = 0.02) and no effects
for Family ownership dummy (r = 0.002, p = 0.69) and Family supervi-
sory board (r = 0.006, p = 0.54). The mean effect size differences
between the reference group Family ownership percent and the vari-
ables Family ownership dummy, Family supervisory board, and Strong
family influence are statistically significant. Founder firms have a
smaller mean effect size than later-generation family firms, but this
difference is insignificant. Dividing the sample based on the leverage
definitions used in the primary studies, we find negative mean effect
sizes for all subsamples. The mean effect size is the lowest for Long-
term debt/assets (r = −0.034, p ≤ 0.001) and the highest for Long-term
debt/equity (r = −0.003, p = 0.84). Moreover, we divided our sample
by firm size. Samples that investigate only the largest (r = −0.044,
p ≤ 0.001) or smallest public firms (r = −0.060, p = 0.09) show smaller
effect sizes than mixed samples (r = −0.013, p ≤ 0.001). However, only
the difference between All listed firms and Large cap is statistically sig-
nificant. Finally, we split up the sample according to the publication
type of the primary studies. In total, around 75% of effect sizes and
primary studies stem from journal articles. The mean effect size of the
category Journal article (r = −0.014, p ≤ 0.001) is higher than for all
other publication types, but only the difference to the mean effect
size of the category Working paper (r = −0.030, p ≤ 0.001) is statisti-
cally significant (p = 0.04).
In Table 2, we perform an analysis for each country separately to
explore the differences between the included countries. We were able
to analyze 48 different countries from all continents. Furthermore,
64 primary studies observe multiple countries in their study samples.
We find significant negative mean effect sizes for Bangladesh, France,
Germany, Hong Kong, Japan, Jordan, Malaysia, Norway, Peru, South
Korea, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Vietnam.
On the other hand, the mean effect sizes are positive and significant
for Brazil, Kuwait, Pakistan, Poland, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey. In
these countries, family firms have on average higher leverage ratios
than nonfamily firms. For all other countries and for samples based on
multiple countries, we do not find statistically significant effects.
4.2 | Meta-regression results
In the MRA, we test our hypotheses on the impact of shareholder and
creditor rights on the leverage ratio of family firms. In this analysis, we
F IGURE 1 Funnel plot
Note: This figure shows the funnel plot of z-
transformed effect sizes. The white area
represents the 95% pseudo confidence interval
8 HANSEN AND BLOCK
TABLE 2 HOMA Country-Specific Results
k n firms r SE 95% CI Q I2
Australia 7 5 3,609 0.017 0.029 −0.040; 0.073 9.08 (0.17) 52.55%
Bangladesh 11 9 1,025 −0.105*** 0.032 −0.167; −0.042 5.31 (0.87) 0.00%
Belgium 3 2 401 −0.098 0.063 −0.221; 0.025 2.73 (0.25) 28.85%
Brazil 19 12 5,442 0.030** 0.014 0.003; 0.057 13.30 (0.77) 0.00%
Canada 12 11 4,120 0.023 0.017 −0.010; 0.055 11.03 (0.44) 5.98%
Chile 7 6 1,046 −0.026 0.037 −0.098; 0.046 8.01 (0.24) 26.92%
China 16 11 12,115 −0.019 0.027 −0.072; 0.034 73.80 (0.00) 82.44%
Colombia 3 2 214 −0.011 0.070 −0.148; 0.126 0.24 (0.89) 0.00%
Cyprus 1 1 101 0.080 0.101 −0.118; 0.278
Egypt 1 1 154 0.026 0.081 −0.133; 0.186
France 21 18 3,923 −0.045*** 0.018 −0.077; −0.014 18.95 (0.53) 1.14%
Germany 23 16 6,304 −0.053*** 0.016 −0.084; −0.021 30.39 (0.11) 23.80%
Ghana 1 1 23 −0.008 0.224 −0.447; 0.430
Greece 6 6 1,394 0.003 0.027 −0.051; 0.056 4.36 (0.50) 0.56%
Hong Kong 23 20 7,537 −0.024* 0.014 −0.052; 0.003 30.62 (0.10) 28.03%
India 30 25 12,849 0.004 0.017 −0.030; 0.038 64.05 (0.00) 61.79%
Indonesia 24 20 5,622 −0.009 0.017 −0.042; 0.024 25.73 (0.31) 24.15%
Iran 5 5 593 −0.017 0.045 −0.106; 0.071 3.36 (0.50) 12.24%
Italy 52 29 7,941 −0.018 0.016 −0.048; 0.013 55.77 (0.30) 28.04%
Japan 27 9 26,155 −0.068*** 0.014 −0.095; −0.041 52.97 (0.00) 53.41%
Jordan 18 14 2,010 −0.051** 0.023 −0.095; −0.006 20.95 (0.23) 0.00%
Kuwait 10 6 1,130 0.050* 0.030 −0.009; 0.109 4.90 (0.84) 0.00%
Malaysia 49 42 15,994 −0.023** 0.010 −0.043; −0.002 58.32 (0.15) 28.83%
Mexico 12 9 1,059 −0.047 0.031 −0.109; 0.014 7.46 (0.76) 0.00%
Morocco 3 3 128 0.086 0.092 −0.094; 0.266 0.30 (0.86) 0.00%
Netherlands 5 3 489 −0.075 0.046 −0.165; 0.015 1.39 (0.85) 0.00%
Norway 3 3 214 −0.190*** 0.070 −0.327; −0.053 1.47 (0.48) 0.00%
Oman 1 1 68 0.091 0.124 −0.152; 0.334
Pakistan 28 20 4,151 0.047** 0.020 0.008; 0.086 29.89 (0.32) 21.39%
Peru 5 1 295 −0.108* 0.060 −0.226; 0.009 0.04 (1.00) 0.00%
Philippines 1 1 54 0.079 0.140 −0.196; 0.353
Poland 16 7 3,287 0.045* 0.024 −0.001; 0.091 11.46 (0.72) 21.09%
Portugal 5 4 309 0.068 0.058 −0.046; 0.183 0.06 (1.00) 0.00%
Saudi Arabia 14 9 1,290 −0.025 0.028 −0.080; 0.031 13.02 (0.45) 0.00%
Singapore 3 2 443 −0.059 0.048 −0.153; 0.035 0.02 (0.99) 0.00%
South Korea 17 15 12,905 −0.095*** 0.016 −0.126; −0.064 26.16 (0.05) 49.63%
Spain 32 18 3,176 0.014 0.022 −0.029; 0.056 29.12 (0.56) 13.54%
Sri Lanka 1 1 210 0.177** 0.070 0.041; 0.313
Sweden 16 10 2,992 −0.052* 0.030 −0.111; 0.006 21.16 (0.13) 44.43%
Switzerland 3 3 481 −0.069 0.046 −0.159; 0.021 1.97 (0.37) 0.00%
Taiwan 87 59 65,850 0.019*** 0.006 0.007; 0.030 127.03 (0.00) 35.39%
Thailand 12 9 4,292 −0.019 0.017 −0.051; 0.014 9.17 (0.61) 6.83%
Tunisia 5 5 174 0.011 0.079 −0.145; 0.166 3.50 (0.48) 0.00%
Turkey 25 16 4,076 0.038** 0.016 0.007; 0.070 10.60 (0.99) 0.00%
UAE 1 1 40 −0.110 0.164 −0.433; 0.212
UK 9 6 1,851 −0.052* 0.028 −0.107; 0.003 9.09 (0.33) 19.62%
(Continues)
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exclude the observations from multicountry samples because we are
not able to merge country-level variables with these observations.
Table 3 reports the values of the country-level variables used in the
regression for each country, and Table 4 reports the correlation coeffi-
cients between these variables and the effect sizes. The effect size
measure, which reports the relationship between family firms and
leverage, is positively correlated with shareholder protection and nega-
tively correlatedwith creditor rights and the three country-level control
variables. With one exception, all country-level variables are positively
correlated with each other. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values
indicate that we do not face multicollinearity issues in our model.
Table 5 reports the results of the hierarchical MRA. In Model
1, we test the regression model without Shareholder rights and Creditor
rights and include only country-level and methodological control vari-
ables. Within the group of country-level control variables, Financial
structure index has a negative and slightly significant effect on family
firm leverage (β = −0.004, p = 0.08), whereas the level of Contract
enforcement (β = −0.001, p = 0.75) and Ln GDP/capita (β = −0.006,
p = 0.12) do not show significant effects. With regard to the family
firm definition used, Family ownership dummy (β = 0.028, p ≤ 0.001)
and Family supervisory board (β = 0.025, p = 0.02) show positive and
significant effects as compared with the reference category Family
ownership percent. Furthermore, Later generation has a positive and
significant effect on family firm leverage (β = 0.026, p = 0.04). We do
not find any significant effects regarding the measurement of leverage
in the primary studies. Both firm size variables, Small cap and Large
cap, show negative effects (only slightly significant for Large cap). For
the type of study, working papers report on average lower effect sizes
than journal articles. We do not find any significant effects for the var-
iables describing sample characteristics.
In Model 2 and Model 3, we add Shareholder rights and Creditor
rights to test our moderation hypotheses. As predicted in Hypothe-
sis 2, the level of Shareholder rights has a positive and significant effect
on family firm leverage (β = 0.012, p = 0.002). The effect of Creditor
rights on family firm leverage, on the other hand, is negative as
predicted in Hypothesis 3 (β = −0.006, p = 0.02). Both effects remain
significant in the full model when testing the effect of both variables
simultaneously (Model 4). Therefore, we find support for both
Hypotheses 2 and 3. However, the effect of shareholder rights on
family firm leverage appears to be predominant owing to its larger
regression coefficient. Concerning the other country variables, we do
not find any consistent moderating effects for the relationship
between family firms and financial leverage. The control variables
related to family firm definitions, measurement of leverage ratio, and
study characteristics remain largely unchanged compared to the base
model.
4.3 | Robustness checks and post hoc analyses
As a first robustness check, we replace our two continuous variables
on creditor and shareholder rights by two dummy variables. Both vari-
ables are equal to 1 for countries with strong creditor or shareholder
rights. In order to define strong creditor and shareholder rights, we
divided the sample along the median values. The results of Model 1 in
Table 6 confirm our main analysis. Whereas strong shareholder rights
have a positive effect on family firms' leverage ratio relative to
nonfamily firms (β = 0.022, p = 0.001), strong creditor rights have a
negative effect (β = −0.024, p ≤ 0.001).
To further investigate the effect of shareholder protection on
family firm leverage, we divide the shareholder rights index into its
subindices “Extent of conflict of interest regulation index” and
“Extent of shareholder governance index.” The results of Model
2 reveal that the positive effect of shareholder rights on family firm
leverage mainly stems from shareholders' rights in corporate gover-
nance, which includes shareholders' rights in major corporate deci-
sions, mechanisms to protect shareholders from undue board control
entrenchment, and the transparency on ownership stakes, compensa-
tion, audits, and financial prospects. This finding supports the view
that family firms rely on higher leverage ratios when shareholder
rights guarantee minority shareholders greater influence.
In Model 3, we test the possible impact of the countries' legal ori-
gin as an alternative to shareholder and creditor rights. We distinguish
between common law, French civil law, German civil law, and Scandi-
navian civil law countries (Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007; La
Porta, Lopez-de-Silvanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). Countries with a
common law origin are typically associated with stronger shareholder
and creditor rights than civil law countries (La Porta et al., 1998).
However, we do not find significant effects for civil law countries
compared to common law countries, except for Scandinavian
TABLE 2 (Continued)
k n firms r SE 95% CI Q I2
United States 112 78 85,495 −0.058*** 0.007 −0.072; −0.045 287.02 (0.00) 63.43%
Vietnam 1 1 655 −0.090** 0.039 −0.167; −0.013
Multiple 83 64 123,200 −0.003 0.007 −0.016; 0.010 310.52 (0.00) 70.57%
Note: This table reports the HOMA results on family firm leverage for each of the included countries. k denotes the number of effect sizes. n denotes the
number of studies. r denotes the mean effect size. SE denotes the standard error. 95% CI denotes the 95% confidence interval. Q denotes the amount
of residual heterogeneity and its significance (p-value in parentheses). I2 denotes the proportion of between-study variance to total variance. Mean
effect sizes are calculated with additional random effects corresponding to the study level.
*p < .10. **p < .05. ***p < .01.
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TABLE 3 Country-level variables
Shareholder rights Creditor rights Enforcing contracts index Financial structure index Ln GDP/capita
Australia 6.00 9.00 7.90 0.18 10.79
Bangladesh 5.50 2.50 2.22 −1.16 6.51
Belgium 6.17 6.50 6.43 −0.43 10.65
Brazil 6.50 5.00 6.60 −0.30 9.21
Canada 7.83 8.50 5.71 0.36 10.74
Chile 6.00 5.50 6.58 0.20 9.38
China 6.00 6.00 7.90 −0.40 8.16
Colombia 7.50 9.50 3.43 −0.42 8.67
Cyprus 6.67 6.00 4.86 −1.02 10.26
Egypt 5.83 6.50 4.28 −0.54 7.73
France 6.67 5.00 7.49 −0.11 10.59
Germany 5.83 7.00 7.04 −0.57 10.61
Ghana 5.17 6.00 5.40 −0.89 7.11
Greece 6.33 5.00 5.02 −0.67 10.12
Hong Kong 7.83 7.50 6.91 2.53 10.26
India 8.00 8.00 4.12 0.62 7.02
Indonesia 6.33 7.00 4.72 −0.18 7.94
Iran 3.33 5.00 5.82 −0.93 8.58
Italy 5.83 4.50 5.48 −0.45 10.48
Japan 6.00 5.50 6.53 −0.44 10.69
Jordan 4.67 3.50 5.56 0.18 8.13
Kuwait 5.83 3.50 5.96 0.42 10.61
Malaysia 8.17 7.50 6.82 0.06 9.03
Mexico 5.83 9.00 6.70 −0.10 9.08
Morocco 6.00 4.50 6.09 −0.64 7.83
Netherlands 5.83 4.50 5.99 0.10 10.78
Norway 7.50 5.50 8.13 −0.52 11.36
Oman 4.67 3.50 6.00 −0.44 9.77
Pakistan 7.17 4.50 4.35 0.85 6.88
Peru 6.33 7.50 6.07 −0.11 8.38
Philippines 4.33 0.50 4.60 0.08 7.58
Poland 6.17 7.50 6.44 −0.70 9.29
Portugal 6.00 4.50 6.79 −1.00 9.98
Saudi Arabia 8.00 4.50 6.34 2.29 9.77
Singapore 8.00 7.50 8.45 1.03 10.62
South Korea 7.33 6.50 8.42 0.43 9.86
Spain 7.00 6.00 7.09 −0.17 10.29
Sri Lanka 6.67 4.00 4.12 −0.81 7.81
Sweden 6.83 5.50 6.76 0.58 10.80
Switzerland 5.00 6.00 6.41 0.74 11.17
Taiwan 7.50 5.00 7.51 0.76 9.76
Thailand 7.50 7.00 6.79 −0.53 8.41
Tunisia 5.67 5.00 5.93 −1.20 8.18
Turkey 7.17 7.50 7.18 0.23 9.20
UAE 7.50 7.00 7.59 −0.54 10.83
UK 7.50 7.50 6.87 0.05 10.54
(Continues)
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TABLE 3 (Continued)
Shareholder rights Creditor rights Enforcing contracts index Financial structure index Ln GDP/capita
United States 6.47 9.50 7.26 4.68 10.76
Vietnam 5.50 7.50 6.21 −1.11 7.02
TABLE 4 Descriptive statistics and
correlation matrix
Mean SD (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) VIF
(1) Effect size −0.02 0.09
(2) Shareholder rights 6.75 0.89 0.11 1.17
(3) Creditor rights 6.47 1.86 −0.11 0.23 2.21
(4) Enforcing contracts index 6.53 1.17 −0.08 0.18 0.29 1.74
(5) Financial structure index 0.81 1.73 −0.12 0.12 0.63 0.30 2.67
(6) Ln GDP/capita 9.61 1.21 −0.16 −0.10 0.24 0.64 0.37 2.18
Note: n = 786. The variance inflation factor (VIF) values are derived from Model 4 in Table 5.
TABLE 5 Meta-regression results (H2 and H3)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Shareholder and creditor rights
Shareholder rights (H2) 0.012 (0.004)*** 0.014 (0.004)***
Creditor rights (H3) −0.006 (0.002)** −0.007 (0.002)***
Country-level control variables
Contract enforcement index −0.001 (0.004) −0.004 (0.004) −0.001 (0.004) −0.004 (0.004)
Financial structure index −0.004 (0.002)* −0.004 (0.002)** −0.000 (0.003) 0.001 (0.003)
Ln GDP/capita −0.006 (0.004) −0.003 (0.004) −0.006 (0.004)* −0.003 (0.004)
Family firm variables
Family ownership percent Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Family ownership dummy 0.028 (0.008)*** 0.029 (0.007)*** 0.029 (0.008)*** 0.030 (0.007)***
Family management −0.003 (0.009) −0.003 (0.009) −0.003 (0.009) −0.004 (0.009)
Family supervisory board 0.025 (0.010)** 0.024 (0.010)** 0.024 (0.010)** 0.024 (0.010)**
Strong family influence 0.006 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) 0.006 (0.009) 0.008 (0.008)
Undefined family influence −0.008 (0.008) −0.006 (0.008) −0.008 (0.008) −0.005 (0.008)
Family firm generation
No generational control Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Founder generation 0.015 (0.012) 0.016 (0.012) 0.016 (0.012) 0.018 (0.012)
Later generation 0.026 (0.013)** 0.028 (0.013)** 0.027 (0.013)** 0.029 (0.013)**
Leverage ratio variables
Total debt/assets Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Total debt/equity −0.002 (0.009) −0.002 (0.009) −0.002 (0.009) −0.002 (0.009)
Long-term debt/assets −0.006 (0.008) −0.007 (0.008) −0.006 (0.008) −0.007 (0.008)
Long-term debt/equity 0.015 (0.021) 0.011 (0.021) 0.017 (0.021) 0.012 (0.021)
Firm size
All listed firms Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Small cap −0.041 (0.031) −0.042 (0.031) −0.043 (0.031) −0.043 (0.031)
Large cap −0.018 (0.010)* −0.018 (0.010)* −0.015 (0.010) −0.014 (0.010)
Article type
Journal article Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Working paper −0.020 (0.010)** −0.019 (0.009)** −0.019 (0.009)** −0.017 (0.010)*
PhD thesis −0.012 (0.014) −0.011 (0.014) −0.008 (0.014) −0.006 (0.014)
(Continues)
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TABLE 5 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Student thesis −0.015 (0.014) −0.011 (0.014) −0.014 (0.014) −0.009 (0.014)
Sample characteristics
Median year 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Panel dataset 0.001 (0.009) −0.001 (0.009) −0.000 (0.009) −0.003 (0.009)
Constant 0.046 (0.032) −0.053 (0.045) 0.084 (0.036)** −0.019 (0.046)
k 786 786 786 786
n 550 550 550 550
Pseudo R2 0.16 0.19 0.18 0.22
ICC 0.92 0.92 0.92 0.92
QResidual 1,302.03 1,266.01 1,274.50 1,238.16
QModel 75.14 86.53 81.80 96.46
I2 (%) 45.63 44.72 44.78 43.69
Note: This table reports the results of the hierarchical meta-regression analysis on family firm leverage. The dependent variable is the z transformed effect
size. The variable Shareholder rights denotes the extent of minority investor protection in a country. The variable Creditor rights denotes the extent of
creditor rights in a country. All variables are described in Appendix A. Coefficients are reported with corresponding standard errors in parentheses. k
denotes the number of effect sizes. n denotes the number of studies. Pseudo R2 denotes the proportion of heterogeneity explained by the included
moderators. ICC denotes the intraclass correlation coefficient. QResidual denotes the amount of residual heterogeneity. QModel denotes the amount of
the test statistic for the omnibus test of coefficients. I2 denotes the proportion of between-study variance to total variance.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
TABLE 6 Robustness checks and post hoc tests
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Alternative shareholder and creditor rights
Strong shareholder rights (=1) 0.022 (0.007)***
Strong creditor rights (=1) −0.024 (0.007)***
Shareholder rights subindices
Extent of conflict of interest regulation index −0.004 (0.003)
Extent of shareholder governance index 0.017 (0.003)***
Legal origin
Common law Ref. cat.
German law 0.017 (0.011)
French law 0.008 (0.010)
Scandinavian law −0.046 (0.026)*
Country-level control variables
Contract enforcement index −0.005 (0.004) −0.006 (0.004)* −0.005 (0.004)
Financial structure index 0.001 (0.002) 0.004 (0.003) −0.001 (0.003)
Ln GDP/capita −0.004 (0.004) 0.001 (0.004) −0.005 (0.004)
Family firm variables
Family ownership percent Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Family ownership dummy 0.029 (0.007)*** 0.030 (0.007)*** 0.030 (0.008)***
Family management −0.004 (0.009) −0.001 (0.009) −0.002 (0.009)
Family supervisory board 0.023 (0.010)** 0.025 (0.010)** 0.025 (0.010)**
Strong family influence 0.006 (0.008) 0.010 (0.008) 0.007 (0.009)
Undefined family influence −0.007 (0.008) −0.005 (0.008) −0.009 (0.008)
Family firm generation
No generational control Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Founder generation 0.017 (0.012) 0.017 (0.012) 0.017 (0.012)
Later generation 0.028 (0.013)** 0.027 (0.013)** 0.026 (0.013)**
(Continues)
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countries, which include Norway and Sweden (β = −0.046, p = 0.08).
This result is likely driven by the Norwegian observations, which show
the lowest mean effect size across all countries (Table 2).
Our main analysis shows that there exist differences in the
effect sizes reported in working papers as compared with effect
sizes reported in published studies. As a robustness check, we
therefore re-estimated our model only for the sample of published
articles.4 We found that the main effects regarding shareholder and
creditor rights are very similar as in the main analysis. As another
robustness check, we ran a model on the full sample of studies
where we excluded the article type control variables from the
regression to ensure that our main results are not driven by
multicollinearity effects. Again, the results were similar to the results
of our main analysis.
5 | DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
In this study, we examine the relationship between the family firm sta-
tus of public firms and capital structure and the moderating role of
countries' shareholder and creditor rights. The results of our HOMA
reveal an overall slightly negative but statistically significant relation-
ship between family firms and leverage ratio. This finding is opposed to
many well-published empirical studies investigating family firm lever-
age that find higher leverage ratios for family firms (e.g., Croci
et al., 2011; King & Santor, 2008; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). Rather, it
supports the view of the risk-averse family firm that eschews debt, as
proposed by Mishra and McConaughy (1999). However, our results
also reveal a large amount of heterogeneity among the effect sizes.
Some of this heterogeneity can be attributed to the methodological
TABLE 6 (Continued)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Leverage ratio variables
Total debt/assets Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Total debt/equity −0.002 (0.009) −0.002 (0.009) −0.002 (0.009)
Long-term debt/assets −0.006 (0.008) −0.006 (0.008) −0.006 (0.008)
Long-term debt/equity 0.016 (0.020) 0.009 (0.020) 0.015 (0.021)
Firm size
All listed firms Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Small cap −0.048 (0.031) −0.045 (0.031) −0.041 (0.031)
Large cap −0.015 (0.010) −0.019 (0.010)** −0.017 (0.010)*
Article type
Journal article Ref. cat. Ref. cat. Ref. cat.
Working paper −0.017 (0.009)* −0.016 (0.009)* −0.021 (0.009)**
PhD thesis −0.004 (0.014) −0.005 (0.014) −0.008 (0.015)
Student thesis −0.009 (0.014) −0.011 (0.013) −0.010 (0.014)
Sample characteristics
Median year −0.000 (0.001) −0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Panel dataset −0.004 (0.009) −0.004 (0.009) 0.001 (0.009)
Constant −0.054 (0.033)* −0.082 (0.044)* 0.051 (0.033)
k 786 786 786
n 550 550 550
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.25 0.18
ICC 0.92 0.91 0.91
QResidual 1,227.77 1,205.75 1,285.64
QModel 100.59 108.50 83.85
I2 (%) 43.14 42.54 44.87
Note: This table reports the results of the hierarchical meta-regression analysis on family firm leverage. The dependent variable is the z transformed effect
size. Strong shareholder rights is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the extent of shareholder rights is above the sample median. Strong creditor rights is a
dummy variable equal to 1 if the extent of creditor rights is above the sample median. Extent of conflict of interest regulation index measures the protection
of shareholders against directors' misuse of corporate assets for personal gain. Extent of shareholder governance index measures shareholders' rights in
corporate governance. Common law, German law, French law, and Scandinavian law are dummy variables that characterize a country's legal system. All
variables are described in Appendix A. Coefficients are reported with corresponding standard errors in parentheses. k denotes the number of effect sizes. n
denotes the number of studies. Pseudo R2 denotes the proportion of heterogeneity explained by the included moderators. ICC denotes the intraclass
correlation coefficient. QResidual denotes the amount of residual heterogeneity. QModel denotes the amount of the test statistic for the omnibus test of
coefficients. I2 denotes the proportion of between-study variance to total variance.
*p < 0.10. **p < 0.05. ***p < 0.01.
14 HANSEN AND BLOCK
choices of the primary studies, such as variable choices, definitions
used, or sample characteristics. For example, we find a significant dif-
ference between family ownership measured as a continuous variable
and family ownership measured as a dummy variable. Previous studies
on family firm performance (e.g., Miller, Le Breton-Miller, Lester, &
Cannella, 2007) have already highlighted the importance of family firm
definitions on performance outcomes. In the samemanner, we note the
importance of family firm definitions used in studies on capital struc-
ture and its potential influence on study outcomes. A large portion of
the observed effect size heterogeneity can also be attributed to
country-specific characteristics. Conducting univariate analyses for
each of the 48 countries included in the sample, we observe consider-
able mean effect size differences. For many countries, especially those
with only one or a few observations, we do not find significant differ-
ences in leverage ratios to nonfamily firms. Among those countries with
negative and significant mean effect sizes, we find large economies
such as France, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and the United States.
The negative relationship betweenUS family firms and leverage contra-
dicts the findings of Anderson and Reeb (2003), who do not find differ-
ent leverage ratios between family and nonfamily firms. For France and
Germany, our results confirm previous empirical studies (Ampenberger
et al., 2013; Benkraiem et al., 2018; Latrous & Trabelsi, 2012;
Margaritis & Psillaki, 2010; Schmid, 2013) that observe lower leverage
ratios for family firms in these two countries. On the other hand, we
find positive and significant relationships between family firm status
and leverage only for seven emerging or transition economies: Brazil,
Kuwait, Pakistan, Poland, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Turkey.
In the next step, we tested the moderating impact of country-
level corporate governance variables, especially the impact of creditor
and shareholder rights. The results of our hierarchical MRAs report a
significant impact of both variables. Whereas stronger shareholder
rights lead to higher leverage ratios in family firms, stronger creditor
rights have the opposite effect. These findings support both modera-
tion hypotheses and show the importance of country-level corporate
governance variables in family firms' capital structure decisions. In
countries with strong creditor rights, firms are generally more reluc-
tant to use debt and undertake less risky investments, as they fear
being forced into bankruptcy by their creditors in times of financial
distress (Acharya, Amihud, & Litov, 2011; De Jong et al., 2008). We
show that this effect might be even more pronounced in family firms
because their owner families are weakly diversified and have strong
control considerations. The plausible loss of control in the case of pay-
ment default threatens the owner family's SEW and keeps it away
from dispensable debt money. In the same manner, Ampenberger
et al. (2013) and Schmid (2013) argued that strong creditor rights and
the accompanying tight creditor monitoring impede debt financing
among family firms, even during normal business operations. On the
other hand, strong shareholder rights increase the power and poten-
tial influence of minority shareholders. As a result, family owners rely
more strongly on debt and avoid raising equity due to a dilution of
control and potential contestability of voting rights (Boubakri &
Ghouma, 2010; King & Santor, 2008). Our results suggest that this
effect is even stronger than the negative effect of strong creditor
rights on family firms' use of debt. Post hoc analyses show that espe-
cially minority shareholders' rights in corporate governance are the
driving factor for higher leverage ratios in family firms across coun-
tries. These results indicate that family firms use the capital structure
as a means to ensure and optimize control over the firm. In this way,
we show that family firms follow different decision-making processes
and strategic considerations in capital structure decisions than
nonfamily firms. Previous studies have also shown these divergences
for R&D investments (Block, 2012; Chrisman & Patel, 2012), diversifi-
cation decisions (Gómez-Mejía et al., 2010), or acquisitions (Caprio,
Croci, & Del Giudice, 2011). Our results further indicate that the risk-
aversion and control-enhancing views on family firm leverage are not
necessarily conflicting theories but that the predominance of one or
the other depends on environmental conditions in terms of laws and
institutions.
Our study, like every empirical study, also has some limitations
that offer opportunities for further research. First, owing to the com-
parably small number of studies investigating the capital structure of
family firms as a dependent variable, we used only Pearson correlation
coefficients. Partial correlations from regression coefficients could
control for a potential omitted variable bias stemming from other
firm-specific leverage determinants (Frank & Goyal, 2009;
Myers, 2001). However, current articles on meta-analytic best prac-
tices (e.g., Combs, Crook, & Rauch, 2019; Roth, Le, Oh, Iddekinge, &
Bobko, 2018) discourage a joint analysis of both data types. For this
reason, we rely solely on Pearson correlation effect sizes.
Second, our study can reflect the influence of family firm hetero-
geneity on capital structure only to a limited degree by using different
family firm variables. Thus, family firm heterogeneity is also a promis-
ing direction for further future research on capital structure decisions,
as family firms appear in various forms around the globe
(Steier, 2009). This variety includes single-sector family firms in
Anglo-American or Continental European countries as well as large
multisector business groups in East Asian countries, reflecting differ-
ent corporate governance structures. Previous studies suggest that
particularly the separation of ownership and control is an important
factor in capital structure decisions in family firms (King &
Santor, 2008). Control-enhancing mechanisms such as pyramids or
dual-class shares increase agency conflicts with both minority share-
holders and creditors (Pindado, Requejo, & de La Torre, 2015). These
agency conflicts should also impact financing costs and result in
higher required premiums for capital provision (Boubakri &
Ghouma, 2010; Gao et al., 2020; Lin, Ma, Malatesta, & Xuan, 2011).
However, creditors and shareholders might evaluate the expropriation
risk differently and hence require different risk premiums, which in
turn impact the financial incentives for family firms to use equity or
debt (Paligorova & Xu, 2012). This evaluation might also depend on
the countries' institutional settings. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2003)
find lower agency costs of debt and thus lower financing costs for
family firms in the United States, a country with investor-oriented
laws and highly developed capital markets, whereas Boubakri and
Ghouma (2010) and Lin et al. (2011) find the opposite for international
datasets. Furthermore, not only the legal framework but also the
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importance of personal relationships with creditors and political con-
nections might be important determinants of capital structure deci-
sions, access to capital, and terms of contracts in some countries
(Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra, & Saffar, 2012; Claessens, Feijen, &
Laeven, 2008; Houston, Jiang, Lin, & Ma, 2014).
We also do not consider private firms in this study. As private
family firms often do not have any other nonfamily minority share-
holders, the logics in capital structure decisions might be different
from public firms (Romano, Tanewski, & Smyrnios, 2001). On the one
hand, if family owners are unwilling to raise any equity from nonfamily
investors, they are restricted solely to debt financing. These strong
control considerations could also result in higher leverage ratios but
are detached from the strength of minority shareholder rights like in
public firms. On the other hand, risk-aversion motives might be even
more present in private family firms, where family members typically
occupy management positions, leading to lower leverage ratios as
compared with private nonfamily firms (González et al., 2013).
Moreover, characteristics of the owner family itself might have an
impact on the capital structure decisions of the firm. Owner families
can differ in terms of size, the extent of involvement in the firm,
the generational stage, or the respective family values. These owner
family characteristics significantly impact the priorities and hence
the strategic decisions of family firms (Chua, Chrisman, Steier, &
Rau, 2012; Jaskiewicz & Dyer, 2017). Keasey et al. (2015) examined
the impact of the life-cycle stage on leverage ratios and find a prefer-
ence for higher leverage ratios to prevent a dilution of control mainly
for young family firms with an active founder. The results of our MRA
suggest that leverage ratios are higher in later-generation firms but
should not be overestimated because most primary studies in our
sample do not control for generational influences. Future research
should investigate this generational stage effect and explore if and
under which circumstances family firm evolution and professionaliza-
tion reduces or widens the differences between family and nonfamily
firms regarding capital structure. In the same manner, the structure of
the family—and especially the number of family owners—might impact
capital structure decisions. As family firms undergo successions, the
ownership stake is often fragmented by inheritance, which increases
the number of involved persons and, hence, the potential for diverging
interests and conflicts within the family (Bertrand & Schoar, 2006;
Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004). If the owner family no longer acts as
one collective blockholder, family-specific interests such as control
considerations or risk aversion might lose their importance, and, as a
result, leverage ratios might conform to nonfamily firms. In order to
prevent a fragmentation of the family shares and keep the family heri-
tage, some founders or business families in Scandinavia and German-
speaking countries transfer their ownership stakes to foundations
(Thomsen & Rose, 2004). Foundations as owners have gained increas-
ing interest in the academic literature, but still little is known about if
and how this ownership type impacts capital structure decisions. On
the one hand, foundation-owned firms might be risk averse and
eschew debt to not endanger the long-term survival of the firms
(Thomsen, Poulsen, Børsting, & Kuhn, 2018). This view could explain
the lower leverage ratios in Scandinavian countries in our results,
because many primary studies do not clearly distinguish between
foundation and family ownership. On the other hand, there could also
be a necessity for foundation-owned firms to rely more on debt
finance because they might be bound by their charter to always retain
a majority stake in the firm (Achleitner, Bazhutov, Betzer, Block, &
Hosseini, 2020; Block, Jarchow, Kammerlander, Hosseini, &
Achleitner, 2020). To conclude, more research on family firm hetero-
geneity and its impact on capital structure decisions, combined with
the impact of the institutional environment, is needed.
Furthermore, specific events and circumstances could be impor-
tant moderators of family firms' capital structure decisions. Investigat-
ing R&D behavior, Chrisman and Patel (2012) showed that family
firms have in general lower R&D intensity than nonfamily firms owing
to perceived threats to their SEW. However, if their firm performance
is below aspiration levels, they increase R&D investments to a greater
extent than nonfamily firms. The same logic could also be true for cap-
ital structure decisions. Under normal circumstances, family firms
might have lower leverage ratios to decrease firm-specific risk, but
they could increase leverage in case of severe financing needs that
endanger firm survival. An empirical investigation of how leverage
ratios depend on financing needs and change when SEW is threat-
ened would be an interesting future research direction.
Another future research direction is the composition of family firm
debt. To date, some studies have investigated the debt maturity struc-
ture of family firms (e.g., Croci et al., 2011; Jain & Shao, 2015; Shyu &
Lee, 2009). However, little is known about the preferences of family
firms for public or bank debt. As one of a few studies on this topic, Lin,
Ma, Malatesta, and Xuan (2013) identified a preference among family
firms with a large control-ownership wedge for public debt compared
with bank loans, as banks are more effective monitors in deterring
expropriation activities. Lin et al. (2011) and Pan and Tian (2016) fur-
ther showed that banks increase loan spreads as well as required collat-
eral for these firms. Other studies, on the other hand, find that family
firms also rely heavily on relationship lending and benefit from better
capital access and favorable conditions (Crespí & Martín-Oliver, 2015;
D'Aurizio et al., 2015; Yen, Lin, Chen, & Huang, 2015). Maintaining
long-lasting lending relationships with banks would therefore suggest a
preference for bank lending instead of anonymous public lending. Fur-
thermore, Harvey, Lins, and Roper (2004) showed that firms with high
managerial agency costs in weak institutional environments can benefit
in terms of shareholder value from raising capital in stronger monitored
international debt markets, as investors interpret this move as a sign of
credibility. These findings suggest that the source of debt in family
firms is also heavily influenced by firm- and country-level corporate
governance attributes.
To summarize, our study tests the two competing views in the lit-
erature on the capital structure of family firms and finds a predomi-
nance of negative effect sizes in the univariate HOMA model. The
result of an overall negative mean effect size thus supports the view
of the risk-averse family firm that avoids debt due to a low diversifica-
tion of their owners' wealth and a fear of loss in their SEW. On the
other hand, we also find strong support for the control-consideration
view, as family firms adjust their capital structure depending on the
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strength of creditor and shareholder rights in their country. Stronger
shareholder rights have a positive impact on family firm leverage,
whereas stronger creditor rights have a negative impact. These results
suggest that family firms use leverage strategically to ensure their
owner families' dominant position and prevent potentially harmful





1 Search terms for family firms were family firm, family business, family
control, family ownership, ownership structure, family management, and
family CEO. Search terms for leverage were leverage, capital structure,
debt, financing, and gearing.
2 Members of the author team have language skills in German, French,
Italian, and/or Spanish. The studies published in the CNKI and in the Chi-
nese language have been searched and coded by a Chinese PhD
student.
3 We provide a list of all included primary studies in the Supporting
Information.
4 We provide the results in Table B.1 in the Supporting Information.
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Shareholder and creditor rights
Shareholder rights Extent of minority investor protection; average of the “Extent of conflict of interest regulation index” and “Extent
of shareholder governance index” (data source: World Bank's Doing Business).
Creditor rights Extent of creditor rights; average of the “Sum of strength of legal rights index” and “Depth of credit information
index” (data source: World Bank's Doing Business).
Strong shareholder rights Dummy variable = 1 if the extent of a country's shareholder rights is above the sample median.
Strong creditor rights Dummy variable = 1 if the extent of a country's creditor rights is above the sample median.
Extent of conflict of interest
regulation index
Index that measures the protection of shareholders against directors' misuse of corporate assets for personal gain
(data source: World Bank's Doing Business).
Extent of shareholder
governance index
Index that measures shareholders' rights in corporate governance (data source: World Bank's Doing Business).
Common law Dummy variable = 1 if a country has a common law system (data source: Djankov et al., 2007).
German law Dummy variable = 1 if a country has a German law system (data source: Djankov et al., 2007).
French law Dummy variable = 1 if a country has a French law system (data source: Djankov et al., 2007).
Scandinavian law Dummy variable = 1 if a country has a Scandinavian law system (data source: Djankov et al., 2007).
Country control variables
Enforcing contracts index Measure of time and cost for resolving a commercial dispute and quality of judicial processes (data source: World
Bank's Doing Business).
Financial structure index Financial structure index developed by Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine (1999); own calculations based on mean values
of the years 1996–2016 (data source: World Bank's World Development Indicators, for Taiwan: Statistical
Bureau of the Republic of China [Taiwan]). A positive value indicates a more market-based financial system; a
negative value indicates a more bank-based financial system.
Ln GDP/capita Natural logarithm of GDP per capital, measured in constant 2010 USD and calculated as the mean of the years
1996–2016 (data source: World Bank's World Development Indicators, for Taiwan: Statistical Bureau of the
Republic of China [Taiwan]).
Family firm variables
Family ownership percent Dummy variable = 1 if family influence is measured by the ownership stake.
Family ownership dummy Dummy variable = 1 if family influence is measured by an ownership dummy.
Family management Dummy variable = 1 if family influence is measured by management (e.g., family CEO).
Family supervisory board Dummy variable = 1 if family influence is measured by a control function (e.g., family member on supervisory
board).
Strong family influence Dummy variable = 1 if firms are defined as family firms if at least two of the previous influences are prevalent.
Undefined family influence Dummy variable = 1 if firms are defined as family firms if either of the previous influences is prevalent.
Family firm generation
No generational control Dummy variable = 1 if there is no control on generation.
Founder generation Dummy variable = 1 if the founder or first generation is active in the firm.
Later generation Dummy variable = 1 if a firm is in the hands of a later generation.
Leverage ratio variables
Total debt/assets Dummy variable = 1 if leverage ratio is measured by total debt/assets.
Total debt/equity Dummy variable = 1 if leverage ratio is measured by total debt/equity.
Long-term debt/assets Dummy variable = 1 if leverage ratio is measured by long-term debt/assets.
Long-term debt/equity Dummy variable = 1 if leverage ratio is measured by long-term debt/equity.
Firm size
All listed firms Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study observes all listed firms in a country.
Small cap Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study observes only small listed firms.
Large cap Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study observes only the largest listed firms.
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Variable name Description
Article type
Journal article Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study is published in an academic journal.
Working paper Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study is a working paper.
PhD thesis Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study is a PhD thesis.
Student thesis Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study is a student thesis.
Sample characteristics
Median year Median year of the study sample (mean centralized).
Panel dataset Dummy variable = 1 if the primary study is based on panel data.
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